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Abstract
Standard Vietnam War narratives often argue that the U.S.
lost
the war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an unconventional conflict. Based on a reappraisal of learning processes
rather than on the outcome of the war, this essay argues that as an
organization, the U.S. Army did learn and adapt in Vietnam; however,
that learning was not sufficient, in itself, to preserve a South Vietnam
in the throes of a powerful nationalist
A reexamination of
the Army's strategic approach, operational experiences, and organizational changes reveals that significant learning did occur
the Vietnam War despite the conflict's final result.

Introduction
One of the dominant narratives of the Vietnam War in the last
has centered on the argument that the U.S. Army, often broadly defined, lost the
war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an unconventional
conflict. In fact, denunciations of the
willingness to learn appeared even
before the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. Critics
to a system
which rewarded those who "practiced conformity ... and encouraged officers to
Gregory A. Daddis, a U.S. Army colonel, holds a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and is an Academy Professor in the Department of History, United States
Academy, West Point, New York. A veteran of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, he
has served as the command historian for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq in Baghdad. His books
include Fighting in the Great Crusade: An 8th Irif(mtryArtillery Officer in World Uizr II (2002) and
No Sure Victory: Measuring US. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam U0r (2011).
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1 Postwar """""""'_,..,,.,,H.
hide mistakes" and to a service culture riven
,.,.,,.,,.,,1-i,,.r1 ~ui•-~iu, followed suit. One commentator
0

-'"'-"''"""iuiii,__,

to understand the need for
become that it even "ignored

that came from within."2
Influential histories of the war seemed to reinforce such
In
America in
maintained that the U.S.
attrition while
of population
1he
arguing that the
because it never realized that
warfare required basic changes
in
methods to meet the exigencies of this 'new' conflict environment."3 This
narrative of unsuccessful
became fashionable with
of
well-received
a cautionary tale linking
For
won in
because it was a
lost in Vietnam because it was not. "The
averred, "resisted any true attempt to learn how to
an insurgency
the course of the Vietnam
preferring to treat the war as a
conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War and World War II."4
Some
Lewis
contend that the
did learn,
ieaae1~sn1p of Creighton
who took command of the
Assistance
Vietnam
in mid-1968. 5
~u·J~,;;.;i, standard historiography of the war offers somewhat of a false -~-.~~~· __ ,,,,
Either the U.S.
failed in Vietnam because it refused to learn and adapt, or
it did learn and succeeded militarily,
to have the fruits of victory traded away
m
This essay offers the more nuanced
that while
much of the
proved capable ofleaming and adapting throughout its time in
too often factors outside of the Army's influence vitiated its efforts. In
the fact that the U.S.
in Vietnam fails to prove that it did not learn.
1. Edward L. King, 7he Death of7he Army: A Pre-Mortem (New York:
Review
Press,
75. William R. Corson,
ofFailure (New York: W.W. Norton &Company, Inc.,
100-101.
2. Cincinnatus,
ofthe United States Army during the Vietnam Era (New York: W.W. Norton
1981), 9-10.
3. Guenter
in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Un1vers11ty Press, 1978), 82-85.
Andrew F.
and Vietnam (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Press, 1986), 259.
to Eat Soup with a
A.
University of Chicago Press, 2002), xxii.
uv_u.._. 1,,L., Better Vl!ar: 7he Unexamined Victories and Final
Last
Years in Vietnam
York: Harcourt Brace &
1999). Sorley more recently has argued that Gen. Westmoreland, Abrams's predecessor, failed to learn (or at least "it is not clear
what he learned") during his tenure as COMUSMACV; Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who
Lost Vietnam (Boston and New York: Houghton Miffiin Harcourt, 2011), 117.
'-''-JLH.A>.iev.
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As an organization, the U.S
did learn and
in
that
learning was not sufficient in itself for securing victory.
focusing on the process
of learning, rather than on the war's outcome, this article examines elements of
American strategy, operational innovations, and organizational change to suggest
that American defeat in Vietnam cannot be explained by reluctance, even resistance,
to learning about the complexities of unconventional warfare.
.Pnrn1·nu

in Vietnam

Crucial to any assessment of military learning is comprehending how armies
draw conclusions from their own experiences and those of others, particularly
the enemy, while engaged in combat. Organizational learning theorists caution
that it is individuals acting as agents of organizations, rather than organizations
themselves, who learn. Certainly, institutions establish systems which either
facilitate or impede the learning process. Organizational culture, biases, and
rewards all shape the practice of learning. Individuals, however, frame problems,
design solutions, and act to solve problems. 6 This seemingly small point can
illuminate studies of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Changes in doctrine, alterations
to organizational structure, and modifications to the employment of force all took
place in a dynamic wartime environment which changed over time and varied
widely from province to province. Charges that the Army failed as a "learning
organization" often underrate the mosaic nature of Vietnam while overvaluing
the influence of a constraining organizational culture.
Acknowledging this caveat, Harvard Business School's David A. Garvin
usefully defines a learning organization as one "skilled at creating, acquiring,
interpreting, transferring, and retaining knowledge, and at purposefully modifying
its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights." 7 Garvin's characterization
implies a dual process of intellectual growth and behavioral change. In assessing
the U.S. Army in Vietnam, one thus must observe not only patterns oflearning
but also adaptation on the battlefield. In this sense, adaptation is a manifestation
of learning and suggests that learning may be meaningless, at least in war, unless
it is demonstrated in practice. Of course, not all organizational change stems from
learning. 8 All armies at war respond to stimuli, both internal and external, and
such responses can be divorced from a formal learning process. To evaluate if an
6. Chris Argyris, On
(Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 8, 123.
Bo Hedberg, "How organizations learn and unlearn," in Handbook of Organizational Design, vol.
1,
to their environments, ed. Paul C. Nystrom and William H. Starbuck
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6.
7. David A. Garvin,
in Action: A Guide to
the
to
Work (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 11. In terms of gaining and retaining
knowledge, it is important to note that Nagl argues that the
"had neither the knowledge
nor the desire to change its orientation away from conventional wars"; Nagl,
to Eat
Soup with a Knife, 126.
8. Jack S. Levy, "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," International
48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 288.
MILITARY HISTORY
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army
is
nowt'.ver. it seems necessary to evaluate the
between
intellectual processes and the
innovations or adaptations produced
the
addition of new knowledge. 9
many of MACV's officers imperfectly made such linkages.
Historians like
Krepinevich and Loren Baritz highlight culture's role
u.au.-.,.uu.iu,,ui; the connections between learning and progress, arguing that
of counterinsurgency stemmed from institutional rigidity and an
on!arnz:ltl<)n<U desire to fight conventional warfare in Europe. One former U.S.
officer even has maintained that the average American soldier was "not well
suited" for
in Vietnam since it was "not in keeping with the
10
"
Arguing, however, that culture limited learning
to such a
as to cause failure appears exaggerated. Surely Army culture in
the
1960s produced biases and predispositions in officers already inclined
to conventional warfare based on their organization's recent history in Korea and
World War II. Yet even if military organizations learn within existing intellectual
constructs, cultures can and do change. Hardly does an organizational, or even
national, culture
determine policies as other variables, especially in wartime,
11 Recent scholarship even indicates that the explanatory power
are at
of culture diminishes for armies actively involved in war. 12
Further complicating any analysis of Army learning in Vietnam is the war's
outcome. Ignoring Clausewitz's warning against making "judgment by
"
cnt1c
N agl assessed organizational learning in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972
asking the question "Did the U.S. Army develop a successful counterinsurgency
doctrine in Vietnam?" 13 Such outcome-based analysis fails to acknowledge the
possibility that the
could learn and still lose. In equating learning with
also discounted the prospect that both the regular North Vietnamese
9. Dima
discusses the linkages between the nature of military organizations and
the innovation produced in 7he Culture ofMilitary Innovation: 7he Impact of Cultural Factors on
the Recuolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security
Studies, 2010), 7.
10. Adrian R. Lewis, 7he American Culture of U!ar: 7he History ofUS. Military Forcefrom World
Ular II to
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 225. Loren Baritz, Baclifire:A His/1n\cPrz.ran Culture Led us into Vietnam and Made us Fight the Uizy We Did (Baltimore,
Hopkins University Press, 1985),233. Krepinevich, 7heArmy and Vietnam, 5.
11. Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to
(London: Routledge, 2006), 8. See also Henry Mintzberg and Frances Westley, "Cycles of
>rg:amzat10n.al Change," Strategic
13 (Winter 1992): 40. On military organizations learning within their own cultures, see Brian M. Linn, 7he Echo ofBattle: 7he Army's
Uizy
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
12. Patrick Porter, Military Orienta/ism: Eastern War 7hrough Western Eyes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 15-16.
13. Nagl,
to Eat Soup with a Knife, 174. Carl von Clausewitz, On Uizr, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Everyman's Library, 1976,
1993), 194.
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and the largely unconventional forces of the National Liberation
might have learned at a faster rate throughout the war than their
American adversaries. In this sense, Garvin's definition oflearning organizations is
significant. Process matters. Acquiring, interpreting, and transferring knowledge,
as well as modifying behavior, constitute a progression of actions that cannot be
explained only by an organization's end state.
Setting aside the issue of defeat or victory in Vietnam, the U.S.
process oflearning in the years following World War II illustrated an organization
committed to altering routines and practices based on the experience of combat.
In 1951, soon after the Chinese entered the Korean
the Army's Office of
the Chief of Information distributed a series of pamphlets titled Army Troop
Ieformation Discussion Topics. That same year the Army staff published a special
regulation, Processing of Combat Ieformation, which systematized procedures for
capturing and institutionalizing combat lessons from Korea. The Army's Assistant
Chief of Staff, G3, now responsible for compiling training and operational lessons,
oversaw the implementation of "lessons learned" from the front lines into training
programs throughout the service. This coordinated, and fairly comprehensive,
reporting and processing system sought to improve combat effectiveness by candidly
sharing the experiences of veterans. As General John R. Hodge commented in the
introduction of the March 1953 issue of Combat Information, "lessons learned"
bulletins brought out "some of the more important deficiencies in our infantry
operations in Korea."1 4
The Army's headquarters codified this process of recognizing challenges and
confronting them with institutional learning in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
In 1959, Army Regulation (AR) 525-24, Combat Operations-Command Report,
established guidelines for the "rapid and effective collection, evaluation, and
application of specific lessons learned in combat operations." 15 One year later AR
525-60 prescribed explicit procedures for the processing of combat operations. By
May 1966, six months after American soldiers first grappled with NVA regulars in
South Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley, the Department of the Army had established a
foundation for organizational learning which would remain in place for the remainder
of the Vietnam War. AR 1-19, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, instituted a
"system for the collection, recording, evaluation, and appropriate corrective action
for operational requirements contained in operational reports." 16 These OR/LLs
14. Hodge quoted in Dennis J. Veto ck, Lessons Learned· A History of US Army Lesson Learning (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army Military History Institute, 1988), 85; on Korean War "lessons learned" processes, see 79-86. On changes in organizational routines and practices, see M.
Leann Brown, Michael Kenney, and Michael Zarkin, eds., Organizational Learning in the Global
Context (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), 4.
15. Department of the Army, AR 525-24, Combat Operations-Combat Report, Washington, D.C., 29 October 1959.
16. Department of the Army, AR 525-60, Combat Operations: Processing of Combat Information, Washington, D.C., 17February1960 and AR 1-19, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned,
26 May 1966. Ronald H. Spector notes that the "lessons learned" process was an imperfect one
MILITARY HISTORY
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1he US.

constituted a
intellectual
South
Assistance ~'""''"'~,,,~,
time in
a process for collecting and
combat lessons.
Formed on 8
MACV issued its first "lessons learned" report on
30
an account of Heliborne
Cai
in An Xuyen province.
A
stream of reports soon followed. The MACV staff shared knowledge on
auuJL'-'"J'"""' "clear and hold" operations,
and resources
the VC
infrastructure. Both the
and
processes indicate that an
feedback
commanders and their units to
from the combat experiences
of others. The content of these reports certainly was important, but so too was
the
process itself. Rather than rejecting new ideas about fighting in an
unconventional environment, many commanders purposefully shared evaluations
of their unit's performance in combat. Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson of
the 173rd Airborne Brigade believed that his recurring Commander's Combat Note
encouraged his officers and soldiers "to continue those things that were proven to
be
and to avoid repeating our mistakes." 18
Williamson's emphasis on interpreting, sharing, and then applying new
information
that MACV's commanders learned both inductively and
As seen
many U.S.
officers underwent a deductive
process, studying broad conceptual ideas on counterinsurgency and
unconventional warfare and then attempting to apply those lessons on the political
and
battlefields of Vietnam. Officers like Williamson also made use of
inductive learning skills. Gathering new knowledge by observation and experience,
these "reflective practitioners" actively sought to improve their effectiveness by
"'V",,,....,.~,..11 nrr their understanding of the war through doctrinal revisions, through
articles, and in the OR/LLs themselves. 19
Of course, inductive learning in Vietnam could be exceedingly difficult.
Commanders faced numerous problems in assessing the impact of their operations.
The results of their efforts were not always visible. Unit commanders like General
at best. "Those commanders who had the time or inclination to read such publications were
perfectly free to disregard them"; Spector, After Tet: 1he Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New
York: Free Press, 1993), 218.
17. Lessons learned index in Headquarters, United States
Assistance Command,
Vietnam
"Combat Experiences 5-69," 6 January 1970, p. 11-8, U.S. Army Military
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (hereafter cited as MHI).
18. Williamson quoted in Vetock, Lessons Learned, 106. Certainly, it might be suggested
that this was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Williamson wrote the commander's notes, so he was preto viewing them as useful. On the importance of both content and process, see W. Warner Burke,
Change: 1heory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 2002), 14.
19. Reflective practitioners in Leon de Caluwe and Hans Vermaak,
to Change: A
Jrv1111z.zatwn Change Agents (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003), 267. On inductive
versus deductive learning, see Mintzberg and
of Organizational Change," 41.
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Williamson
to sustain proven
but the
of
-i-.~"'"·~~ in Vietnam often
a true assessment of what worked well in
of
When the 173rd launched

effectiveness.
as an ~'"'~~ 1 =
Vietnamese government had wrested IJVUU~~"
The 173rd Airborne
instructive for gaining insights into
in
Vietnam. The unit's three-fold mission mu~~D• 0 +- 0
commanders in MACV
understood the multifaceted nature of a conflict that
was a
revolutionary, international, conventional, and guerrilla war. MAC V's · .. ·'' ... _, ....... .
1965 directive on the employment ofU.S. forces in Vietnam specified that the "war
in Vietnam is a political as well as
war. It is
because the ultimate
goal is to regain the
and cooperation of the
and to create conditions
which permit the
to go about their normal lives in peace and
Without question,
officers and soldiers oftentimes imperfectly
their newly acquired knowledge in such a complex
environment.
To argue, however, as does Nagl, that the U.S.
failed to learn in Vietnam
depreciates the ways in which reflective
to the demands of
unconventional war in Southeast Asia.
did not prevent learning about unconventional war.
Confronting L'o:uniteri~nsi~1rv·em7v

A basic pillar of the Vietnam War's
is the contention that the
U.S. Army only poorly understood, if not consciously resisted, counterinsurgency
in the early 1960s. Despite the newly inaugurated John F. ..,,.,_u,,~A•
emphasis on political and social reform as key elements in
insurgencies,
a culturally constrained army, so goes the argument, remained wedded to viewing
unconventional warfare through a very conventional lens. While offering an
20. Operation New Life in John M. Carland,
the
1965 to October 1966
(Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 92-93. On problems evaluaLting
data, see Burke,
16; and Garvin,
in Action, 23. On the more
general problem of assessing American operations in Vietnam, see Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure
11/1,./'°,,..,.,,.,. U.S. Army Ejfecti'7.1eness and Progress in the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
21. Headquarters, MACV, Directive Number 525-4, "Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam," 17 September 1965, In-Country Publications
Folder, Historian's Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
(hereafter cited as CMH). On the multifaceted nature of the war, see Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.
MILITARY HISTORY

*

235

GREGORY A. DADDIS

The US.

i'-'LHai.u, such a
does
which considered insurgent threats in
the intellectual aspects of warfare in the age
of national liberation did not escape the
officer corps. While one needs to
take care when
of the "officer
as a single entity, evidence suggests
many officers realized that both atomic weaponry and decolonization in the wake
of World War II were
an impact on the conduct of war. Without question,
the U.S.
made an enormous intellectual and materiel investment in limited
uuvu"'"'JU-L the 1950s. Yet
this focus, one officer writing in
1v1.u1t,rJr1; Review surmised that the "tactics oflimited war"
in future conflicts. 2 2
0
~r'",_,,.., •·=,, warfare and the Chinese civil war further
influenced
of armed conflict in the post-World War II
era. One lieutenant colonel thoughtfully outlined the relationship between communist
and the need
the local civilian population.
"""V""'"'""'"~''"' in Indochina, the colonel highlighted how "peaceful
could become "guerrillas ... under the cover of darkness."23
in an award-winning article, found "no apparent distinction of any
s1g:mttca11ce ... in Communist military thought between a political struggle and
'~'T"""'"~~ the smell of gunpowder."24 If some officers were reluctant to study any
,..,,..,,i,.,_,,...,, t-h'""'rh+ which departed from conventional operations-and certainly, some
were-many others
a keen appreciation for the complexities of warfare in
the first decades of the Cold War era.
A review not
but also of the Army's doctrine and
its
education system, indicates that many among the officer corps were
neither seduced
the prospects of nor culturally constrained by their preference
for conventional war in
Counterinsurgency, especially after 1960, became
a
of study and debate. Officers deliberated the paramilitary, political,
and civic actions required to defeat a subversive insurgency. 25 They reflected on
how best to coordinate military and non-military measures when committed to a
rr.11H1f-p~·1n•C0111"0-P•nr·u effort. As one lieutenant colonel argued, "political, sociological,
and economic measures which we may take to counter insurgency will prove only
to be sterile efforts if they are conducted from a position of military weakness and
within an inadequate security base."26 Clearly not all officers subscribed to the ideas

22. Robert K. Cunningham, "The Nature of War," Military Review 39, no. 8 (November
1959): 56. On the
and limited war, see Christopher M. Gacek, 1he Logic ifForce: 1he Dilemma
U1ar in American
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 138.
B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," Military Review 39, no. 10
1960): 54.
24. Carl M. Guezlo, "The Communist Long War," Military Review 40, no. 9 (December
1960): 22.
25. Jonathan F. Ladd, "Some Reflections on Counterinsurgency," Military Review 44, no.
10 (October 1964): 73.
26. Gustav]. Gillert, Jr., "Counterinsurgency," Military Review 45, no. 4 (April 1965): 29.
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of unconventional warfare-one believed the counte1~1nsu1r12:e:nc:v mission should
be given to the Marine Corps-but enough
seriously pondered such
theories to raise questions about the Army's
disinterest in
about
new and unfamiliar concepts. 27
Doctrinal concepts mirrored the complexities being discussed in the
professional journals. Though Army field manuals often conflated terms like
insurgent, guerrilla, and irregular forces, a continual revision process LH'~"L""'·'V"-<L
the 195Os and mid-1960s ensured that the theoretical underpinnings of
unconventional
remained current. Field Manual
31-21, Guerrilla
declared in
1955 that for anti-guerrilla actions to be suc:ce~'snu,
"should be based on a detailed
of the country, national characteristics, the
customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people."28 In early
doctrine
introduced terms such as "ideological bases of resistance" and "civic action'' to its
readers. The February 1963 version of FM
Counterguerrilla Uil Pru•twnc
noted that "counterguerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and
improvisation by the opposing commanders." 29 The manual likewise counseled
that "conventional intelligence techniques must be adapted to the situation and
tailored to exploit the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the
area of operations and enemy being encountered." 30
While Army doctrine alluded to the importance of learning and intellectual
adaptability, field manuals advocated a holistic approach to the problems of countering
internal subversion and insurgencies. The 1963 version of FM 31-16 warned against
operations focused solely on enemy combat units. Effective counterinsurgency operations
also required "appropriate action against the civilian and underground support of the
guerrilla force, without which it cannot operate."31 Thus, FM 31-16 spent considerable
time on issues of population control, civil improvement, and the use of existing police
forces and intelligence nets. Importantly, both the 1963 version of FM 31-16, and its
March 1967 revision, discussed the importance of an integrated training approach to
prepare for the complexities ofcountering insurgencies.As the revised manual perceptively
argued, such operations "normally are long-term with a complicated interplay of tactical
operations, populace and resources control operations, and concurrent psychological,
intelligence, and advisory assistance operations, and military civic action."32
1

27. On the U.S. Marine Corps taking over counterinsurgency, see Walter Darnell
"This Matter of Counterinsurgency," Military Review 44, no.10(October1964): 85.
28. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla U1aifare, Washington, D.C.,
May 1955, 53. The manual also stressed the importance of synchronizing efforts among various
governmental agencies.
29. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-15, Operations Against
Forces,
Washington, D.C., May 1961, 4, 18, 25; FM 31-16, February 1963, 2.
30. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-16,
Operations, Washington, D.C., February 1963, 94.
31. Ibid., 20.
32. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-16,
Operations, Washington, D.C., March 1967, 147.
MILITARY HISTORY
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school
followed
the
aeve1_otJ1m1::nt if at a somewhat slower
pace. In
General Staff
at
Fort Leavenworth established a
of Unconventional Warfare and
revised its curriculum to
the 19591960 academic year, CGSC students
on unconventional warfare
the
instruction had increased to 222
waited until 1962 to
,.--,,-a.,--,--.--,-,-~,~~ r,r.nnt-ic.r 1 nc 11 rrrPr\rU lessons into curricula. Vietnam veterans
as
modified small arms instruction to better prepare soldiers
cuu.uu."H'-·"'· and
1965 the
School had constructed two mock
South Vietnamese villages for instructional use. 34 That year, the Armor School's
Officer Candidate Course at Fort Knox was using Bernard Fall's The Two
Tanham's Communist
and Truong Chinh's Primer
Revolt in its insurgency lessons. 35
.L/',"l-J'.lL" their responsibilities to master conventional fighting on a potentially
ba1:tle:new, officers increasingly accepted unconventional warfare into their
~~~ULH•~· educational venues, and professional journals. Even at commissioning
institutions like the United States
Academy, unconventional warfare
became
of the curriculum. West Point Superintendent William C.
V\Testmoreland established a Counterinsurgency Training Committee in April
1962 and instituted mandatory counterinsurgency training for all cadets. The
Counterinsurgency Committee found that the "interdisciplinary
nature" of the subject required cadets to study the "political, military, economic,
and sociological aspects" of unconventional conflict. 36 Cadets
studied the theoretical works of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap while
""""'J-'-VLH.Li":. the histories of revolutionary struggles in the Philippines,
and
33. On CGSC course subjects in the 1959-1960 school year, see "Summary of the 19591960
Command and General Staff Officer Course," Special Collections, Combined
Arms Research
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On 1969 course hours, see Boyd L. Dastrup,
1he
Command and General Stqj[College:A
(Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower
Press, 1982), 111.There were over 1,100 hours in the total CGSC curriculum.
34. Andrew J. Birtle, US. Army Counterinsurgency and
Operations Doctrine,
1942-1976
U.S.
Center
History, 2006), 264-65.
35. "Increased Emphasis-Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare Instruction,"
Armor 73, no. 1
1964): 58. Program oflnstruction (POI) for Associate Armor Officer Career Course,
1964, and POI for Branch Immaterial, Officer Candidate
Course, 29 September 1965, in Special Collections, U.S. Army Armor School Library, Fort
Knox, n.LHLl-<'-'-'-Y·
36. Michael S. Davison, "Report of Counterinsurgency Committee," 19 June 1963, Training
Unerat1011s Files (Counterinsurgency Committee), Special Collections, Jefferson Library, United
Point, New York. Cadet training in Samuel Zaffiri, U!estmoreland·A
bzorrrat>/Jv of General William C. U!estmoreland (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 96.
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Indochina. Westmoreland himself would visit
to
in Vietnarr
as MACV's deputy commander in 1964 in an effort, he recalled, to "learn from ar:
earlier pacification experience." 37
The implementation of this knowledge undeniably met with limited success ir:
South Vietnam. Americans in a foreign land struggled when applying conventiona:
tactics which often were irrelevant or even counterproductive. Both doctrine anc
OR/LL reports continued to emphasize hard-hitting military operations anc
maintaining the initiative against the guerrilla. One battalion "lessons learned'
report argued that the "old slogan 'Find 'Em-Fix 'Em-Fight 'Em and Finisr
'Em!' is as true today as it was the first time it was spoken." 38 These evocatiorn
of conventional warfare gave ammunition to critics who, oblivious to
efforts at learning, railed against the aggressiveness "of the American characte1
which gave added impetus to their impatience and impulse." Journalist France~
Fitzgerald, highlighting the cultural aspects of the war, likened American Gls tc
an "Orwellian Army [whichJ knew everything about military tactics, but nothin~
about where they were or who the enemy was." 39 Several officers even contendec
that successful training programs need only focus on adaptation to fighting in 2
jungle environment. 40
Despite some officers' narrow conceptions of how best to counter politicalmilitary insurgencies, to argue, as does General Dave R. Palmer, that "man)
professional officers did not even recognize the term 'counter-insurgency"' ignore~
the many who did. 41 Learning within the officer corps did occur. Professional~
did conceive of counterinsurgency as something more than just a military affai1
for soldiers. 42 The Army's doctrine on unconventional warfare recognized the
importance of political, economic, and social aspects. Europe may have remainec
the preferred theater of conflict within the larger Cold War context-and arguabl)
the most dangerous-yet the Army's officer corps earnestly wrestled with th(
37. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976)
82. Westmoreland recalled, rightly so, that ''Although it was an enlightening visit, so many wen
the differences between the two situations that we could borrow little outright from the Britislexperience." Cadet studies in Birtle, US. Army
and
Operation
Doctrine, 26 l.
38. Battalion report quoted in Headquarters, Department of the
Pamphlet No. 35015-9,
Operations-Lessons Learned, 1April1968, p. 32, MHI.
39. Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: 1he Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Bos·
ton: Little, Brown, 1972), 370. American character in Robert Thompson, No
Vietnan
(New York: David McKay, 1969), 126.
40. Ron Milam, Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View
Officers in the Vietnam Wa;
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 95.
41. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons ofthe
US.-Victnam in Perspective (San Rafael
Calif: Presidio Press, 1978), 24.
42. William Colby saw "the basic American misconception of the war as an affair for soldiers on both sides, rather than a political attack by the Communists, supported by militar)
forces." Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account ofAmerica's Sixteen-Yea;
Im.1oluement in Vietnam (Chicago and New York: Contemporary Books, 1989), 184.
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co1irntermsuri2:er1cy. Far from

1he US.

wedded to conventional

'-~'"'-''IJLV, many serving officers willingly pondered, debated, and learned about

how best to
their
to war in an unconventional setting. It was a
,_,~ •• ~ •.L._., that would be replicated in South Vietnam as MACV's senior military
commander
a campaign strategy for a new kind of war.

and the
is the ubiquitous and pejorative label for American strategy
in Vietnam. Critics of the war maintain that as the U.S.
prosecuted its
,.....,,-nnr n·n in South Vietnam, it
a flawed strategy of attrition,
'-~·"'-'~ii,., ......"...,'"'' at the expense of all other missions, on killing enemy soldiers. Such
narratives argue that General William C. Westmoreland, MACV's commander
from 1964 to 1968, focused on the "traditional attack mission of the infantryto find, fight and destroy enemy forces." 43 Hypnotized
the prospects of high
counts and seduced by visions of decisive battlefield victories, officers like
Westmoreland led the Army to failure because they failed to better employ a
counterinsurgency strategy. Instead, they opted for attrition and in the process
squandered their chances for victory.
Alluring as such arguments are, they fail to consider Westmoreland's own views
on "the importance of the people deciding which side they wanted to support." Even
in the wake of the Ia Drang battle in late 1965, MACV's commander concluded that
the "most significant development" of the war would be the Vietnamese population
supporting the Saigon government. 44 Hardly wedded to a so-called Army concept
which saw the application of firepower as the surest path to victory, Westmoreland
spoke
on of civic action, food distribution, and medical care as the central
feature of operations designed to restore governmental control to former VC areas. 45
grounded in conventional operations with service in World War II and the
Korean War, Westmoreland, much like the Army from which he came, accepted the
idea that opposing revolutionary wars of national liberation in the late 1950s and
1960s required more than just military power.
criticisms of American strategy in Vietnam are not groundless.
According to a 1974 survey of general officers, more than one-third of respondents
•i"'~~-"· U.S. objectives in Vietnam were "rather fuzzy" and "needed rethinking
as the war progressed." The Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to develop a coherent
.Pn'.rn1no-

11

in Vietnam, 46. For other traditional narratives on a strategy of attrition,
see
C. Herring, Americas Longest Wtir: 1he United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 2002), 179; and Robert D. Schulzinger,A Time.for Wtir: 1he
United S'tates and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 182.
44. General Westmoreland's History Notes, 31 December 1965, in 1he Wtir in Vietnam: 1he
if William C. Westmoreland, ed. Robert E. Lester (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications
of America, 1993), text-fiche, Reel 6, Folder 3, 27 Dec 65-1 Jan 66.
45. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Wheeler, cable, 11 November 1965, Pacification Folder,
Box 4, Paul L. Miles Papers, MHI.

240

*

THE JOURNAL OF

in the Vietnam Ufclr

plan for Vietnam that fit within
a larger national grand strategy,
leaving Westmoreland, according
to one senior American officer, "to
invent his own strategic concept."46
Furthermore, the MACV strategy
aimed to accomplish lofty
The U.S. Commander in Chief,
Pacific
directed
Westmoreland to achieve the
daunting political-military objective
of a "stable and independent
noncommunist government" in
South Vietnam. 47 (Nearly a decade
of war would demonstrate the
incapacity of American military
might to achieve such a goal.)
To accomplish such a broad
mission, Westmoreland necessarily
developed an all-encompassing
concept of operations that sought
not only to destroy enemy forces
General William C. Westmoreland, 210ez)reJno1;r
but also to expand the percentage of
1967, Vietnam [ARC #530616,
South Vietnam's population under
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas]
the Saigon government's control.
In early 1965, this appeared
a formidable-some officials worried an unachievable-task. Most American
estimates of the situation inside South Vietnam painted a grim picture. Political
instability wracked the Saigon government. NLF insurgents posed both a political
and military threat in the countryside and increasingly demonstrated a willingness
to confront South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units in battle. Political subversion,
assassination of government officials, and attacks on infrastructure continued at an
alarming rate. Equally grave, American intelligence
picked up indications
of regular
units from North Vietnam infiltrating into the south. 48
Westmoreland, believing the American advisory effort had done all it could to
46. Bruce Palmer,Jr., quoted in 7he Second Indochina
efa
Held at
Airlie, Virginia, 7-9 November 1984, ed. John Schlight (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 155. Survey data in Douglas Kinnard, 1he War Managers: American Generals
Reflect on Vietnam (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977; New York: DaCapo
Press, 1991), 24.
47. 1he Pentagon Papers: 1he Defense Department History if United States
zn
Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed., 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972), 4:300.
48. Westmoreland to Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram, 7 June 1965, in U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations if the United States, 1964-1968, 34 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government
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Saigon
recommended the introduction of
On 26 June 1965, the
B.
administration
authorized MACV "to commit U.S. ground forces anywhere in the country when,
in his
were needed to strengthen South Vietnamese forces." The
number of American forces rose precipitously. At the opening of 1965, 23,000 U.S.
troops were in Vietnam. One year later the number soared to
troops. 49
In
Westmoreland outlined his
of operations which noted
that the "insurgency in South Vietnam must eventually be defeated among
in the hamlets and towns."The MACV Commander went on to speak
of security-from "large, well
and equipped forces" and
from "the
the
the terrorist and the informer." 50 The population
thus had to be secured from both insurgents and
military formations.
Westmoreland likened the political subversives to "termites" which were eating
away at the foundation of the Saigon
Concurrently, main force
or
"waited for the opportune moment to strike at the weakened
structure with crowbars. As Westmoreland recalled, if the Americans and their
South Vietnamese allies were to be successful, "Neither facet could be ignored." 51
Westmoreland's analogy of termites and bully
be dismissed as
simplistic, but evidence supports the argument that the general realized attrition
main force units could not be achieved at the expense of pacification or
counterinsurgency. The opposite also held true. Westmoreland could not conduct
insurgents while ignoring the conventional threat. All the
American forces needed to aid their South Vietnamese allies in pacifying
and provide some sense of security to the rural population.
Westmoreland used the word "attrition'' in both his memoirs and in his
uvic;u.•~'-"-" with senior and subordinate commanders. Such communications,
suggest the general was focused less on killing the enemy and more on
U"'-U"''~"''H"" to those directing the war effort that the conflict in Vietnam would not
be concluded
Attrition emphasized that the war would be prolonged. As
Westmoreland wrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
1965,
"the
behind whatever further actions we may undertake ... must be that

Office, 1992-2006): 2:733-34 (hereafter cited as FRUS). See also Graham A. Cosmas,
MACV: The joint Command in the Years
1962-1967 (Washington:
Center
2006), 203; and John Prados, Vietnam: The History ef an Unwinnable War,
University Press of Kansas, 2009), 116.
49. Herbert Y. Schandler, The
ef a President:
Johnson and Vietnam
t'nncc~to1:i, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 27. Troop numbers in Schulzinger,A Time
for War, 183.
50. Westmoreland, "Concept of Operations-Force Requirements and Deployments,
South Vietnam," 14 June 1965, Folder 04, Box 02, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research), Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas (hereafter cited as

51. Westmoreland,A Soldier Reports, 175.
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This struggle has become a war of attrition .... I see no
favorable end to the war." 52
so
in the war, reveals a commander
enemy forces and more concerned about the
power of his own armed forces and nation. He
the comtJlex1ty
of his task. As his chief intelligence officer
battle but three to
to develop the
and protect the peasants in the South Vietnamese
the threat and the mission
a broad
of the ~~ 0 ~n-h~.~ 0
word like attrition could not characterize
fighting in South Vietnam caused immense
articulation.
The
lexicon of the
was unsuited to Westmoreland's manifold tasks.
Lacking precise terminology to describe the three battles MACV
any broad strategic concept came with the risk of ambiguity. If attrition
forces had been the guiding light of American
in
one
might expect more certainty among the
senior leaders. Westmoreland's
panoptic strategy, however, left many American field commanders in doubt as to
how their units would achieve such far-reaching objectives.
The tasks associated with Westmoreland's expansive strategic concept-what
he would call a "three-phase sustained campaign''-reflected an army willing to
learn about and adapt to the unconventional environment of South Vietnam.
Phase I visualized the commitment of U.S. and allied forces "necessary to halt the
losing trend by 1965." Tasks included securing major military bases, ae1-en1:1mg
major political and population centers, and preserving and strengthening South
Vietnam's armed forces. In Phase II, Westmoreland sought to resume the offensive
to "destroy enemy forces" and reinstitute "rural construction activities." In this
phase, aimed to begin in 1966, American forces would "participate in clearing,
securing, reserve reaction and offensive operations as required to support and
sustain the resumption of pacification."Finally, in Phase
oversee
the "defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and base areas." It is
important to note here that Westmoreland's official report on the war included the
term "sustained campaign." 54 The general was under no illusions that U.S. forces
were engaged in a conventional war of annihilation aimed at rapid destruction of
the enemy. Attrition suggested that a stable South Vietnam, capable of resisting
uHUU.U<t-Uv•uu.oi

52. Westmoreland to Wheeler, cable, 24 June 1965, Historian's Files, US
1965-1975, CMH. Westmoreland describes a "war of attrition" in A Soldier Reports, 185.
53. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, The
1946-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio
Press, 1988), 354.
54. U. S. Grant Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 100. Command History, United States
Assistance Command, 1965, pp. 141-43, Entry
Box 2, RG 472, National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park,
4:296.
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the
and
pressures of both internal and external aggressors, would
not arise in a matter of months or even a few years.
Nor should Westmoreland's use of the word "attrition" validate assertions that
the American
strategy in Vietnam was singularly focused. In fact, it seems
tJH•'-"~'U-'"''"' to argue that MACV's commander formulated a "one war" approach
without using the label later popularized by his successor. Abrams understood
the
interrelationships of war in
but so too did
fundamental issue is the question of the coordination
of mission activities in Saigon," the
1966. "It is abundantly
clear that all
programs must be
+-t>nr.-.,,~,,.r1 in order to attain any kind of success in a country which has
been
weakened
prolonged conflict and is under increasing pressure
military and subversive forces." 55 Far from being an officer unwilling to learn
about unconventional warfare, Westmoreland thoughtfully considered the issues
of land reform, improving the South Vietnamese armed forces, limiting civilian
56
.... a.,,uou.u...,0, and facilitating population security in the countryside.
The implementation of such an all-encompassing strategy would have been
exceedingly difficult for any Army. Unsurprisingly, American commanders found
it nearly impossible to translate military success into political progress. Military
operations often caused depopulation in the countryside, contradicting goals
of developing a sense of political stability among the people. Tactical successes
oftentimes achieved
temporary results. Not all unit commanders embraced
the ideals
support and governmental reform as necessary ingredients
for overall success. These failures in implementation, however, did not result
from whole cloth resistance to learn on the part of the Army. 57 From a strategic
!JL-J.01-1.__,._.,uv•v, Westmoreland's concept of operations indicated a willingness to
the
behavior. MACV's strategy actually mirrored conceptual
insights derived from Army doctrine and professional journals. So too did unit
.,...,.,""''''"..-.'"'"".-'+-on the extended political-military battlefields of South Vietnam.
·""'''""~"" on

a Convoluted Battlefield
In the early 1960s, the U.S. Army component serving in Vietnam gradually
transformed from an advisory role to an active participant in the war. The
incremental change required a reorientation away from conventional, if not
operations and tactics to an emphasis on area coverage, reconnaissance,
and population security. Critics argue that "the
did not change orientation

55. Westmoreland to Collins, cable MAC 0117, 7 January 1966, Pacification Overview/
Conclusions Folder, Historian's Files, CMH.
56. Cosmas, MA.CV, 140.
57. On general difficulties with implementation, see Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A.
and Arnold Canter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 251.
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to the fundamentally new tasks of
Even when the
did innovate, such as adjusting airmobile tactics for use in a counterinsurgent role,
commentators saw little more than helicopters "rattle-assing around." 59 A more
analytical approach of what the Army did on a
basis,
reveals an
organization far more open to shifting operational perspectives. When employing
their units in South Vietnam, commanders consciously readjusted their approaches
to decision-making and action. Divisional units, operating across the mosaic
of South Vietnam's diverse provinces, actively chose to reframe their ideas on
fighting in an unconventional environment.
The 1st Cavalry Division perhaps best exemplified both the potential and
problems of learning and innovating in Vietnam. Conducting operations in the
Central Highlands, the 1st Cavalry deployed to Southeast Asia as the Army's first
airmobile division in August 1965. Less than three months later, elements of the
division fought a fierce battle against North Vietnamese regulars in the western
highlands' la Drang valley. Westmoreland deemed it an "unprecedented victory"
by highlighting the 634 dead NVA soldiers and a further 1,215 "estimated" enemy
killed in action. Historians subsequently have pointed to this first full-fledged battle
as an action which inhibited learning since it validated the Army's conventional
concept of warfare. As Andrew Krepinevich has maintained, "Standard operations
were working; therefore, no alternative strategies needed to be explored. No more
feedback was required for MACV save the body counts that measured the attrition
strategy's progress." 60
The 1st Cavalry, however, did explore ways to increase its effectiveness in
the aftermath of the la Drang battles. A review of the division's OR/LLs in
1965 and 1966 reveals an organization willing to experiment and reflect on its
operational practices. After-action reports discussed how the conduct of military
operations in inhabited areas "where VC and innocent women and children are
intermingled continues to be a problem." (Even before la Drang Westmoreland
was instructing commanders to use "utmost discretion and restraint" so as not to
cause noncombatant casualties.) 61 Other1st Cavalry reports noted the difficulties
of coordinating artillery and ground fire with the entirely new concept of airmobile
operations, the complexities ofwhich are too often overlooked in many histories.

58. Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 31. On

reorientation, see Vetock, Lessons

Learned, 97.

59. Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face efVl!ar, rev. ed. (Indianapolis and New York: BobbsMerrill, 1968), 78.
60. Krepinevich, The
and Vietnam, 169. Westmoreland quoted in "Westmoreland
Surveys Action," New York Times, 20 November 1965. Assessment of Ia Drang body counts in
Daddis, No Sure Victory, 80.
61. Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct-30 Nov 65," p. 3, Box
1, Operational Report/Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry Division, MACV Command Historian's
Collection, MHI. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Wheeler, cable, 28August1965, R.O.E.Jul-Sep
1965 folder, Box 5, Miles Papers, MHI.
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November
the division's OR/LL was --u~•,u.uu""' lessons related to civil
and
That month the 1st
construction "'"'' tthe purpose of which was to "build
re1at1onshJLP with the local
enhance _,_,,._...,...,-'-"-''H~-" ~-ni-h·=,...,~,~
local VC back into the Government of Vietnam control."
1

0

0

"'

missions. 62
that most divisions

the division found its tactical
submitted in advance to
co1norormsed. Intelligence collection on the NLF -'-"-"'U.L'"'"-'-'"
after
of the difficulties

gained from the civilian population, 1st
of local Vietnamese sources questionable. 63
these challenges, the 1st
reflected on its
and
"'"''"',..,..,..,"' ..... t-"ri with new ideas. The division found "saturation patrolling," which
included both
and night
to be an effective means of hindering VC
actlv1t1es in
areas. It also employed "mobile interrogation teams" to
conduct interviews with the local populace in
of improving its intelligence
64 In
the division's 1st Brigade launched
Rolling
what it considered to be a "classic counterinsurgency operation in the
Stone
the interrelated fields of
r-s1rcn.oHJg1ca1 Warfare and Ground Combat Operations." While
r.nPr.,,f-1r•n resulted in 142 enemy dead, it also illustrated limitations with the
-'-"-'·'"'-'-'--'-""'''ii'-"

of the
Division
28 November 1966, p. 31, Box 1, Up1era,t10na1
Division, MACV Command Historian's Collection, MHL Operation Jim Bowie report in
,_,=~.--.'"M,..,.,,,. 0 1st
Division, "Combat After Action Report," 8
1966, ibid.
1st
Division, "Lessons Learned," 15 March 1966, Box 1, OpLearned, 1st
Command Historian's CollecLearned," 17 June 1966, ibid. On problems assimilating to
warfare, see Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise
U.S. Ground
Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1985), 87.
64.
1st Infantry Division,
Report-Lessons Learned," 1
31
1966, pp. 23-25, 1st Infantry Division File,
Documents, Historian's Files,
CMH.
Jpn~rh-nP••t-

HHHV•JHL·;,"
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Army's effectiveness in Vietnam's
environment.
Rolling Stone did little to dislodge NLF forces from Binh Doung province. More
significantly, the 1st
Division
failed to increase the level oJ
popular support for the Saigon government. Even imDr<)ve:C1
could achieve only so much in a war for the allegiance of the civilian population.
This contest for control of the Vietnamese population extended to tht
southernmost portions of the war-torn country. In the fertile and heavily populatec
Mekong Delta, the 9th Infantry Division began operations in early 196 7. The delt::
consisted of a vast network of waterways, rivers, and tributaries posing
problems for the
arrived division.
earlier French
ir
riverine operations, the MACV staff formulated an innovative
to creat(
a Mobile Riverine Force. For the first time since the American Civil
the
U.S. Army began using an amphibious river force operating
afloat. 61
"Lessons learned" reports discussed issues in coordinating U.S. and Vietnames<
navy assets, integrating helicopters into riverine assault operations, and
troops regularly to prevent immersion foot and skin infections. The riverine fore<
even designed and constructed six barges capable of carrying 105mm howitzers t<
provide artillery support for the division's waterborne forces. "Patrol and ..H~'~"~"'
operations" became a mainstay of the riverine force in an attempt to disrupt enem~
traffic along the delta's spider web of waterways. 67
Far from focusing solely on tactical issues, the 9th Infantry leadership workec
to integrate combat operations with pacification efforts. The division staff utilize<
Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) data, designed to gauge progress in pacificatior
to coordinate combat missions with their own civic action and South Vietnames
programs. The 9th also instituted an Integrated Civic Action Program
to "collect information on the enemy while providing humanitarian assistano
and attempting to improve GVN [Government of South Vietnam] acceptanc
in local hamlets [and] villages." 68 As with other American programs, the result
were debatable. Division commander Major General Julian J. Ewell was an activ
proponent of kill ratios as a measure of success, even earning the nickname "th
Butcher of the Mekong Delta." Thus it was no surprise when John Paul

1

65. Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, "Combat Operations After Actio
Report," 28 March 1966, Folder 58, Box 1, William E. LeGro Collection, TTUVA.
66. Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order
to U.S. Arm
Combat and
Forces in Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2003
77. The challenge was in surprising the enemy since
often knew riverine forces were
67. Headquarters, MACV, "Combat Experiences 3-69," Section III, MHI. Headquarter
Department of the
Pamphlet No. 350-15-10,
Operations-Lessons Learned,
1968, Appendix V, MHI. Ira A. Hunt, Jr., The
in Vietnam:
and
University Press
68. Hunt, 9th Infantry Di'7.1ision, 86, 90. See also Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division,
erational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969," 15 Februar
1969, p. 29, Box 2, Operational Report/Lessons Learned, 9th Infantry Division, MACV Corr
mand Historian's Collection, MHI.
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civilians in

to pacification efforts.
less than 50 percent
. ,.. ,. .... _..,.,were under government
µ,. ... hr•-nc lea.rrnmg had its limits when it came to
effectiveness.
Tactical revisions made
in the aftermath of the
countrywide
1968 Tet offensive emulated those in the 9th
Division. Among the more
contentious debates in the war's historiography, the
of how much American
ch:an~!ed after
Abrams took command of MACV in
,.-..,,+ n for some time. Lewis Sorley, a strident Abrams
riri1'Yl,,.,,,. contends there was "a dramatic shift in
of the nature and conduct
of the war, in the
measure of
and the tactics to be applied."
Andrew
argues persuasively that Abrams's
"differed from
activities more in emphasis than in substance.
The key point
here is that most all of MAC V's officers realized the war itself was changing in the
aftermath ofTet. Forced to recover from the high casualties sustained in early and
NVA and NLF forces altered their tactics to avoid allied advantages
in firepower.
more importantly, American goals shifted with the decision to
"Vietnamize" the war and withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam.
Abrams thus confronted a shifting external environment which forced changes
upon MACV's
if not entire approach to the war. To support President
Richard M. Nixon's
of Vietnamization, in which the South Vietnamese
once again shouldered the entire war effort as the Americans departed, Abrams
concentrated on training
supporting pacification, and continuing offensive
~~P¥r .-.r,~ 0 against the enemy. In the process, MACV adapted to its new operating
environment. Abrams spoke of the challenges "of continuing progress towards total
Vietnamization in a climate of declining U.S. resources, competing demands on
RVNAF [South Vietnam's Armed Forces], and limited time." 71 As Nixon ordered
incursions into Laos and Cambodia in 1970 and 1971 to forestall future enemy
offensives, Westmoreland, now the Army's chief of staff, asked Abrams for a "review
of the lessons learned" from these operations that might "facilitate improvements
and doctrine." 72 Even with the war winding down, officers like
VV1::stmc)relarte1 understood the importance of reflection and objective review.
to understanding wartime Army learning is the diversified nature of the
American experience in Vietnam. Both Westmoreland and Abrams realized their
limited
to control and influence U.S. forces operating across the breadth of
\..VUHL'-'J.1-H'J'-''·".. L-'-''""

,i,

0

0

•

69. Daddis, No Sure Victory, 165.
70. Sorley, A Better War, 17. Birtle, US. Army

and Contingency Operations

Doctrine, 367.

71. Gen. Abrams to Gen. Clay, cable, 5July1971, Abrams Messages #10163, CMH. Headquarters, MACV, "One War: MACV Command Overview, 1968-1972," pp. 2-17 to 2-18, Historian's Files, CMH.
72. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Abrams, cable, 7 April 1971, Abrams Messages #9870,
CMH.
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South Vietnam. As General William E.
that there were several levels of war going on simultaneously, all the way from
the very quiet subversive
war and war of terror down in the hamlets
and villages, all the way up to the main forces and everything in between." 73
The level of organizational learning consequently
on those unit
commanders operating in the distributed, decentralized environment of Vietnam.
Unsurprisingly, the quality ofleadership, and thus learning, varied from
to province. The temperament of commanders became a crucial factor in both
learning and adaptation. As one senior officer
"Some were sensitive
to community relations and the political, economic,
impact of
military operations on attainment of US objectives whereas
less sensitive,
failed to recognize that military operations could
progress in winning
support of the people." 74
,,n,rn1""" and

Support of
Vietnamese people constituted -a vital element of MACV
strategy from the very beginning. Both Westmoreland and Abrams understood
the importance and difficulties of linking the local population to the central
government in Saigon. Both pursued attrition and pacification simultaneously.
In fact, even before Westmoreland took command of
"lessons learned"
reports spoke of "clear and hold" operations which were conducted "in direct
support of province rehabilitation with the mission of clearing and denying an
area to the enemy." 75 At no time during the war did
in balancing military
operations with the pacification effort, fully embrace one mission to the exclusion
of the other. Changes in emphasis certainly did occur over time, and in 196 7
MACV even carried out a significant organizational restructuring to meet the
needs of pacification.
Mobilizing popular support for the Saigon government remained a frustrating
aspect of American strategy in 1965 and 1966. By early 1966 Washington officials
could no longer ignore the inadequacy of governmental coordination in achieving
the goals of pacification. Confusion reigned over who was responsible for the
growing number of military and civilian agencies operating inside South Vietnam:
MACV, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States
Information Agency (USIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As one
73. William E. DePuy, interview by Bill Mullen and Les Brownlee, 26 March 1979, p.
11, Box 1, Oral History, William E. DePuy Papers, MHI. On limited command influence, see
Spector, After Tet, 216.
74. Willard Pearson in memorandum for W. C. Westmoreland, "Post Mortem on Vietnam
Strategy," 6 September 1968, p. 4, US Strategy, Vietnam 1965-75, Historian's Files, CMH. See
also Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: 1he American Struggle for Vietnam'.> Hearts and Minds (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 222.
75. Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Lessons Learned
Number 35: Clear and Hold Operations," 10January1964, Gen. Westmoreland Reading FileJan. 1964, Box 1, Miles Papers, MHI.
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wandering around without any clear-cut direction and
Army staff published a
on the war titled
for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam."
PROVN for
the report charged that "interagency
within the
American mission in Vietnam was a major obstacle hindering the achievement
of U.S.
77 Westmoreland tracked along similar lines, placing command
on revolutionary development and civic action programs and noting
in his strategic
for 196 7 that the
effort should "properly
dovetail the
and civil programs." 78
With pressure for
from the White
a
reluctant U.S.
in Saigon created the Office of Civil Operations (OCO)
in November 1966.
embassy officials feared that OCO would lead to a
of civilian programs-Westmoreland supported MACV serving as
for pacification-the new office directly improved supervision
of the
effort's civil side. 79 OCO unified interagency direction and
created a pacification chain of command from Saigon to the countryside's districts
and
Senior officials working on pacification, from the CIA to USAID,
now worked together in a central location, facilitating planning and coordination.
OCO now managed refugee programs, revolutionary development cadre training,
osivcnLOl<)fllCal operations, and public safety planning. The military side of pacification,
h"''"'""" .. remained outside of OCO's purlieus. Thus, while the office served as the
first full step towards a new pacification organization, the "other war" remained
set)ar:ated from those military operations being conducted
MACV. Less than six
months later, American officials, citing a visible lack of improvement in the field,
dismantled OCO and incorporated it into a new organization. 80
.LJ•~"L'-'.L\- its size, OCO simply did not have the resources to implement the
programs for which it provided oversight. Westmoreland's strategic concept for
considering more than just attrition of enemy forces, left OCO increasingly
unable to cope with the coordination of civil and military efforts. Westmoreland
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·="· "''h,,.rh is
m<m<Jlgeme:nt. "76 In March
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"New
76. Colonel Wilson quoted in Robert W. Komer,
J'a1:iftcatum Program-1966-1969 (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1970), 17.
77. PROVN report in FRUS, 1964-1968, 4:596. See also Andrew J. Birtle, "PROVN,
VVc:strno1:ela.nd, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,
72, no. 4 (October
1213-47.
78. For Westmoreland's views, see "Command Emphasis on Revolutionary Development/
Civic Action
" 22 October 1966, in Lester, 1he Papers of William C. Westmoreland,
text-fiche, Reel 7, Folder 10, 18-29 October 1966; "Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam,"
14December1966, Reel 18, CSA
Statements Folder, October-December 1966; and
and \i\Testmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, 132.
79. On the single manager concept, see Cosmas, MA.CV, 357. Embassy fears in George C. HerUniversity ofTexas Press, 1994), 77-78.
l:'aiT/u·atzon, 82-84; Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizingfor PaciCenter of Military History, 1999), 44-46; and Schlight,
The Second Indochina War, 131.
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Robert Komer and President Lyndon

Lyndon B.Johnson

Austin, Texas]

recalled that as "the American
effort expanded, so did the programs
managed by AID,
and USIA, so that in time all
were competing for
resources and scarce South Vietnamese manpower." 81 The problem
large and complex for OCO to handle alone. If OCO did not have the '--'H-'"-Ll.l.LLU.'-'C
or resources to support pacification, it increasingly became clear that
component of the U.S. mission in Vietnam did have such means. 82
On 9
1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson made MACV the
manager" of pacification in South Vietnam. The president appointed Robert W
Komer, a longtime CIA analyst and National
Council staff ""-'""J'-'L·
as Westmoreland's deputy for pacification. As Johnson declared, this "new
organizational arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and
military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Viet Nam." 83
Holding ambassadorial rank, Komer assumed control of the newly created Office
of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and
reported directly to Westmoreland. The new CORDS chief was not an advisor or
coordinator but rather held broad authority to manage the American pacification
effort. Every program relating to pacification, whether civil or military, now fell
81. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 255. On inability of a civilian-led program to cope, see
Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Vietnam for the Future," Military Review 86, no. 2 (March-April 2006): 12.
82. Cosmas, l\!IACV, 354. Scoville,
Support, 54.
83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, 9
1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968,
5:398.
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7he US.

under the

of Komer and his office. As Westmoreland
it was
arr·ange1nent, a civilian heading a
staff section with a general
and a similar pattern of organization was to follow down the chain of
command.
the president's "single manager" concept guided reorganization
at every level of the U.S. effort in South Vietnam. 84
Unlike its
CORDS incorporated civilians into the military chain
of command.
former OCO staff director, a civilian, headed the CORDS office
in MACV while a brigadier general served as his deputy. (Komer even received
n•'1rhr,,,. . ., , for civilians to write performance
on military personnel.) The main
CORDS
more traditional staff sections like intelligence
oversaw a wide venue of programs. To make the transition
Komer maintained the six field program divisions established under OCO.
His reach over pacification programs, however, expanded greatly. "Personnel," Komer
"were drawn from all the military services, and from State, AID, CIA, USIA,
and the White House." 85 CORDS assumed responsibility for coordinating rural
development programs, conducting village and hamlet administrative training, and
overseeing agricultural affairs and public works projects. The integrated, interagency
office handled research and development planning, wrote MACV policy directives
on
and advised military commanders on civic action programs. Komer
even assumed the
of training and equipping South Vietnamese regional and
"""""'"""forces to provide local security for pacification programs. 86
It was here, at the local level, that Komer sought to address the fundamental
onm1errts of pacification support through reorganization. The new ambassador
ass1gr1ed each of MACV's corps headquarters a deputy for CORDS, usually a
who outranked the corps commander's chief of staff. Similarly, Komer
rd-prl an advisor to each of South Vietnam's forty-four provinces. Illustrating
the collaborative approach of CO RDS, twenty-five provincial advisors were military
~,,.·
the other nineteen, civilians. These province teams reported directly to
the corps deputies while coordinating local military operations with the entire
array of pacification programs. 87 The sheer breadth of pacification requirements,
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nowe:ver. strained the
of Americans in the field.
coul1
accomplish
so much. One American
advising a South Vietnames
infantry division, noted the extent of effort
pacification. Once unit
had established security, they then had to "determine the people's needs, act a
a link between the higher governmental agencies and the people, see that th
needs were met, inform the people,
hamlet self-governmeff
assist the people in agricultural and economic development, establish intelligenc
nets, detect and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure, and
restor
the legitimate government in the hamlet." 88 Establishing a "single manager" fo
pacification surely made sense, but coordinating the vast number of program
under that manager proved extraordinarily difficult.
Still, the chief contribution of CORDS was to pull pacification's numerou
activities under one centralized command. At its
CORDS employe<
roughly 5,500 officials to support its wide range of programs. External pressUft
to reform certainly encouraged the reorganization process. So too, howeve:
did the support of William Westmoreland. The MACV commander gracefull:
endorsed· an arrangement which made few distinctions between civilian am
military officials and backed Komer's ambitions of enlarging the role CORD~
played in local population security. As Westmoreland recalled, "Who headed th1
program at each level depended upon the best man available, not whether h1
was military or civilian." 89 MAC V's commander committed himself to facilitatin!
the implementation of CORDS rather than serving as an obstacle. If CORD~
represented the single most important managerial innovation during the Vietnan
War, Westmoreland's support played a decisive role in the organization's inceptio1
and survival. 90
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84. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260. "Single manager" concept in Komer, Organization
if the "New Model" Pacification Program, 55. For background on Komer,
see Frank L.Jones, "Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy,"
Parameters 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 103-18. On CORDS responsibilities, see Hunt, Pacification, 89-90.
85. R. W. Komer,
Does Its 7hing: Institutional Comtraints on U.S.-GVN Perin Vietnam (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1972), 115. On CORDS staff, see Scoville,
66-67; and Cosmas, MACV, 361.
86. CORDS programs in Schlight, 7he Second Indochina War, 133; and Hunt, Pacification,
90-94.
87.
organization in Hunt, Pacification, 94. Civilian and military advisor numbers in
Chester L. Cooper et al., "The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Volume III:
of Pacification," March 1972, p. 271, Folder 65, U.S. Marine Corps History Division,
Vietnam War Documents Collection, TTUVA.
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Conclusions-When Learning May Not Matter
CORDS certainly streamlined the process of pacification for MACV bu
Westmoreland's (and Abrams's) strategy still required resolving a wide range o
military, political, economic, and social problems. Too often in South Vietnarr
military operations worked at cross-purposes with pacification. Success in om
area did not equate to advances in the other. In truth, CORDS, like so many o
the U.S. Army's programs, never came to grips with the underlying problems o
the war inside South Vietnam. This crucial point suggests that one aspect of th(
war's historiography is, in a sense, flawed. A reexamination of the U.S.
strategic approach, operational experiences, and organizational changes reveal~
that learning did occur during the nearly decade-long struggle in South Vietnam
88. John H. Cushman, "Pacification: Concepts Developed in the Field by the RVN 21s
Infantry Division,
16, no. 3 (March 1966): 26. While Cushman's experiences pre-datec
CORDS, the requirements of pacification had not changed between 1966 and 1967.
89. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260. Numbers of officials in CORDS from Herring
LBJ and Vietnam, 81.
90. Douglas S. Blaufarb, 7he
Era: U.S. Doctrine
1950 t1
Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 240. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 64.
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constrained and

not solve fundamental weaknesses of the
chasm between the Vietnamese
and their
success, whether in combat or civic
",,.,,,,.,,....,.,,..,..for the GVN.
P-v1"'"'"''""'rP in Vietnam indicates that
can learn and still lose. Even with
institutional learning,
can elude leaders committed to changing their organization's behavior based
on observations and experiences. 93
of success and failure was a
,..,.,.,..,,.....,.i,,,,, .. ".ri affair in Vietnam where there were no front lines to mark progress. In
it was difficult to learn. Commanders
to determine what was most
1-'...,,,,u .._ ..._.. action frequently trumped
and how to make sense of an
complex conflict. As one
~~.,"~··~~·~·"In no other war have we been deluged by so many
H.,. ...,_..UH<U'J"' for we have been accustomed to an orderliness associated
with established battle-lines." 94 Still, neither a devotion to conventional warfare
nor an
to understand counterinsurgency prohibited the U.S.
from
learrnmg in Vietnam. As an institution, it
reflected on new concepts,
"'""-1-''"''u'""..'""'·'L'-·~ with new ideas, and shared new methods and practices among its
In the process oflosing a long war, the U.S.
had exhibited the traits

91. Vetock, Lessons Learned, 104.
92. Bruce Palmer,Jr., The 25-Year Wrr.r:America's Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1984), 178. See also Phillip B. Davidson, Secrets of the Vietnam Wrr.r (Novato, Calif:
Presidio Press, 1990), 146. On limits, see James H. Lebovic, The Limits of US. Military
Vietnam and Iraq (Baltimore,
University Press, 2010), 37.
~"'"''"'""'and foreign policy," 297.
94. Harris B. Hollis quoted in Thomas C. Thayer, Wrr.r Without Fronts: The American
ence in Vietnam (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 4.
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